By extending the notion of minimum rank distance, this paper introduces two new relative code parameters of a linear code C 1 of length n over a field extension F q m and its subcode C 2 C 1 . One is called the relative dimension/intersection profile (RDIP), and the other is called the relative generalized rank weight (RGRW). We clarify their basic properties and the relation between the RGRW and the minimum rank distance. As applications of the RDIP and the RGRW, the security performance and the error correction capability of secure network coding, guaranteed independently of the underlying network code, are analyzed and clarified. Silva and Kschischang showed the existence of a secure network coding in which no part of the secret message is revealed to the adversary even if any dim C 1 − 1 links are wiretapped, which is guaranteed over any underlying network code. However, the explicit construction of such a scheme remained an open problem. We solve this open problem by proposing a new scheme and clarifying its performance with the RDIP and the RGRW.
I. Introduction
Secure network coding was first introduced by Cai and Yeung [6] , and further investigated by Feldman et al. [11] . In the scenario of secure network coding, a source node transmits n packets from n outgoing links to sink nodes through a network that implements network coding [1] , [17] , [21] , and each sink node receives N packets from N incoming links. In the network, there is an adversary who eavesdrops µ links. The problem of secure network coding is how to encode a secret message into n transmitted packets at the source node, in such a way that the adversary obtains as little information as possible about the message in terms of information theoretic security.
As shown in [4] , [10] , secure network coding can be seen as a generalization of secret sharing schemes [2] , [31] or the wiretap channel II [30] to network coding. The problem of secret sharing schemes is how to encode a secret message into n information symbols called shares in such a way that the message can be recovered only from certain subsets of shares. In order to solve both problems of secure network coding and secret sharing schemes, the nested coset coding scheme [40] is commonly used to encode a secret message to shares/transmitted packets, e.g., it has been used in [9] , [10] , [27] , [30] , [31] , [34] . The nested coset coding scheme is defined by a linear code C 1 ⊆ F n q m and its subcode C 2 C 1 with dim C 2 = dim C 1 − l (l ≥ 1) over F q m , where F q m denotes an m-degree (m > 0) field extension of a field F q of order q. From a secret message of l elements in F q m , it generates each transmitted packet/each share defined as an element of F q m .
Duursma and Park [9] defined the coset distance as a relative code parameter of C 1 and C 2 . The coset distance is the minimum value of the Hamming weight of codewords in C 1 \C 2 . They revealed that in the case of secret sharing schemes using the nested coset coding scheme, the security guarantee of the scheme deficiency of the transfer matrix at a sink node. The second aim of this paper is to reveal the error correction capability of secure network coding based on the nested coset coding schemes with C 1 and C 2 . For the error correction problem of secure network coding, in Section IV, we define the universal error correction capability against at most t injected error packets and at most ρ rank deficiency of the transfer matrix of a sink node. This is called universal because it is guaranteed independently of the underlying network code, as well as Θ µ,P S ,X and Ω. We clarified that in secure network coding based on the nested coset coding scheme with C 1 and C 2 , the universal error correction capability against t errors and ρ rank deficiency is expressed in terms of the first RGRW of C 1 and C 2 . Although the conference version [20] of this paper considered only the case where the transfer matrix is completely known to each sink node, the analysis in this paper includes not only the case of known transfer matrices but also the case where the transfer matrix is unknown to every sink node.
As an application of the above analyses by the RDIP and the RGRW, this paper also proposes a universal strongly secure network coding constructed from the nested coset coding schemes with C 1 and C 2 , and provides its analysis. In [34] , Silva and Kschischang proposed a secure network coding scheme based on the nested coset coding scheme with maximum rank distance (MRD) codes C 1 and C 2 [14] . Their scheme guarantees that the universal equivocation Θ µ,P S ,X for µ ≤ dim C 2 equals the Shannon entropy [8] of the secret message S when the distribution of the transmitted packets X is conditionally uniform given S . This implies that no information about the message leaks out even if any dim C 2 links are observed by an adversary. In [33] , they also show the existence of the nested coset coding scheme that guarantees the universal maximum strength Ω = dim C 1 − 1 = n − 1 for C 1 = F n q m . However, an explicit construction of the nested coset coding scheme achieving Ω = dim C 1 − 1 had remained an open problem [33] . Inspired by Nishiara et al.'s strongly secure threshold ramp secret sharing scheme [28] using a systematic ReedSolomon code, Section V of this paper proposes an explicit construction using a systematic MRD code with Ω = dim C 1 − 1, and solves the open problem. The earlier version of the proposed scheme was presented in the conference paper [19] . We note that in [19] , the error correction in the scheme was not considered at all. With the addition of error correction, the scheme proposed in this paper is an extension of the earlier version. The analysis of universal security performance of the proposed scheme is provided as an application of the RDIP and the RGRW, which is a different approach from the analysis in the conference version [19] and also from [33] , [34] . We also provide an analysis of the universal error correction capability of our scheme as an application of the RGRW. As well as the scheme of Silva and Kschischang [34] , the proposed scheme guarantees, independently of the underlying network code, that no information of the secret message is obtained from any µ ≤ dim C 2 tapped links, and that the secret message is correctly decodable against any t error packets injected somewhere in the network and ρ rank deficiency of the transfer matrix of the sink node whenever n − dim C 1 + 1 < 2t + ρ holds. Moreover, our scheme also always guarantees that no information about any r F q m -symbols of the secret message is obtained by the adversary with µ = dim C 1 − r tapped links (1 ≤ r ≤ l), unlike Silva et al.'s scheme [33] , [34] . Our only assumption in the proposed scheme is that the network must transport packets of size m ≥ l + n symbols. Note that the proposed scheme completely solves the open problem posed at the end of Section V-B of the survey paper of Cai and Chan on secure network coding [4] .
Here again, we briefly show the structure of this paper. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II defines the RDIP and RGRW of linear codes, and introduces their basic properties. We also show their relations to the existing code parameters in this section. Section III defines the universal security performance over the wiretap network model, and reveals that the universal security performance of secure network coding is exactly expressed in terms of the RDIP and the RGRW. In Section IV, we also reveal that the universal error correction capability of secure network coding is exactly expressed in terms of the RGRW. As an example, an explicit construction of strongly secure network coding is proposed in Section V, and its security performance and error correction capability are analyzed by the RDIP and the RGRW. Finally, Section VI presents our conclusions.
II. New Parameters of Linear Codes and Their Properties

A. Notations and Preliminaries
Let F q be a finite field containing q elements and F q m be an m-degree field extension of F q (m ≥ 1). Let F n q denote an n-dimensional row vector space over F q . Similarly, F n q m denotes an n-dimensional row vector space over F q m . Unless otherwise stated, we consider subspaces, ranks, dimensions, etc, over the field extension F q m instead of the base field F q .
An [n, k] linear code C over F n q m is a k-dimensional subspace of F n q m . Let C ⊥ denote a dual code of a code C. A subspace of a code is called a subcode [24] . For C ⊆ F n q m , we denote by C|F q a subfield subcode C ∩ F n q [24] . Observe that dim C means the dimension of C as a vector space over F q m whereas dim C|F q is the dimension of C|F q over F q .
For Also define
For Γ(F n q m ), we have the following lemmas given in [36] . 
B. Definitions of New Parameters
We first define the relative dimension/intersection profile (RDIP) of linear codes as follows.
Definition 4 (Relative Dimension/Intersection Profile). Let C 1 ⊆ F n q m be a linear code and C 2 C 1 be its subcode. Then, the i-th relative dimension/intersection profile (RDIP) of C 1 and C 2 is the greatest difference between dimensions of intersections, defined as
for 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
Next, we define the relative generalized Hamming weight (RGHW) of linear codes as follows.
Definition 5 (Relative Generalized Rank Weight). Let C 1 ⊆ F n q m be a linear code and C 2 C 1 be its subcode. Then, the i-th relative generalized rank weight (RGRW) of C 1 and C 2 is defined by
for 0
In [29] , Oggier and Sboui proposed the generalized rank weight that can be viewed as a special case of the RGRW with C 2 = {0}.
Here we briefly explain the relation between these new parameters and the existing relative parameters defined by a code and its subcode. For an index set I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, define a subspace 
. This implies that the RDIP of linear codes is always greater than or equal to the RDLP of the codes, and that the RGRW of linear codes is always smaller than or equal to the RGHW of the codes.
We also show the relation between the RGRW and the relative network generalized Hamming weight (RNGHW) [42] . Let F be a set of some one-dimensional subspaces of F n q . Each subspace in F was defined as a space spanned by a global coding vector [13] of each link in the network coded network. (For the definition of global coding vectors, see Section III-A or [13] ). Let 2 F be the power set of F . For 2 F , define a set of direct sums of subspaces by
We restrict the degree m of field extension F q m to m = 1, i.e., C 1 and C 2 are F q -linear subspaces of F n q . Then, the RNGHW of C 1 and C 2 for the network is obtained by replacing Γ(F n q m ) in (2) with Υ F . In addition, the network generalized Hamming weight (NGHW) [27] is obtained by replacing Γ(F n q m ) in (2) with Υ F and set C 2 = {0}, as the relation between the RGHW and the GHW.
Remark 7.
Note that in the definitions of RNGHW and NGHW, the field over which the global coding vectors are defined must coincide with the field over which linear codes C 1 and C 2 are defined. Hence, we restricted the degree m to 1 of the field extension F q m over which C 1 and C 2 are defined. In the case of m = 1, we have Υ F ⊆ Γ(F n q m ). Thus, the RGRW of C 1 and C 2 for m = 1 is always smaller than or equal to the RNGHW.
C. Basic Properties of the RDIP and the RGRW
This subsection introduces some basic properties of the RDIP and the RGRW. They will be used for expressions of the universal security performance (Section III) and the universal error correction capability (Section IV) of secure network coding.
Theorem 8 (Monotonicity of the RDIP). Let C 1 ⊆ F n q m be a linear code and C 2 C 1 be its subcode. Then, the i-th
Proof: K R,0 (C 1 , C 2 ) = 0 and K R,n (C 1 , C 2 ) = dim (C 1 /C 2 ) are obvious from Definition 4. By Lemma 1, for any subspace
Next we show that the increment at each step is at most 1. Consider arbitrary subspaces V,
We note that if we replace Γ i (F Lemma 9. Let C 1 ⊆ F n q m be a linear code and C 2 C 1 be its subcode. Then, the i-th RGRW M R,i (C 1 , C 2 ) is strictly increasing with i. Moreover, M R,0 (C 1 , C 2 ) = 0 and
Proof: First we have
From Theorem 8, we have j :
Therefore the RGRW is strictly increasing with i and thus
In [29, Lemma 1] , it was shown that in the case of C 2 = {0}, the second RGRW M R,2 (C 1 , {0}) is greater than the first RGRW M R,1 (C 1 , {0}).
We note that if we replace Γ(F n q m ) and K R, j (C 1 , C 2 ) in Lemma 9 with Λ(F n q m ) and the j-th RDLP, the lemma coincides with [23, Theorem 3] for the properties of RGHW. Also, if we replace Γ(F n q m ) in Lemma 9 with Υ F , the property of strictly increasing the RGRW shown in the lemma also becomes the property of the RNGHW [42, Theorem 3.2] . Now we present the following upper bound of the RGRW.
Proposition 10. Let C 1 ⊆ F n q m be a linear code and C 2 C 1 be its subcode. Then, the RGRW of C 1 and C 2 is upper bounded by
Proof: We can assume that C 2 is a systematic code without loss of generality. That is, the first dim C 2 coordinates of each basis of C 2 is one of the canonical bases of F dim C 2 q m . Let S F n q m be a linear code such that C 1 is the direct sum of C 2 and S. Then, after suitable permutation of coordinates, a basis of S can be chosen such that its first dim C 2 coordinates are zero. Hence, a code S can be regarded as a code of length n − dim C 2 , and we have M R,dim S (S, {0}) ≤ n − dim C 2 from the definition of the RGRW. On the other hand, since M R,dim S (S, {0}) = dim S * from the definition of the RGRW and Lemma 2, and dim S * ≤ mdim S from Lemma 3, we have M R,dim S (S, {0}) ≤ mdim S = mdim C 1 /C 2 . We thus have
We shall use the mathematical induction on t. We see that
is true for t = dim S = dim C 1 − dim C 2 . Assume that for some t ≥ 1, (4) is true. Then, since the M i (S, {0}) is strictly increasing with i from Lemma 9, we have
holds. Thus, it is proved by mathematical induction that (4) holds for 1 ≤ t ≤ dim (C 1 /C 2 ). Lastly, we prove (3) by the above discussion about the RGRW of S and {0}. For an arbitrary fixed
from the definition of the RGRW. Therefore, from the foregoing proof, we have
, and the proposition is proved. 
D. Relation between the Rank Distance and the RGRW
Next, we show the relation between the rank distance [14] and the RGRW. We will use the relation to express the universal security performance (Section III) and the universal error correction capability (Section IV) of secure network coding.
For a vector x = [x 1 , . . . , x n ] ∈ F n q m , we denote by S(x) ⊆ F q m an F q -linear subspace of F q m spanned by x 1 , . . . , x n . The rank distance [14] between two vectors x, y ∈ F n q m is given by d R (x, y) dim F q S(y − x), where dim F q denotes the dimension over the base field F q . In other words, it is the maximum number of coordinates in (y − x) that are linearly independent over F q . The minimum rank distance [14] of a code C is given as .
. From the definition of the rank distance, there exists a nonsingular matrix P ∈ F 
Since the right n − d columns of T are zero columns, we have rank T ≤ d. On the other hand, since
Lemma 12. For a code C 1 ⊆ F n q m and its subcode C 2 C 1 , the first RGRW can be represented as
Lemma 12 immediately yields the following corollary that shows that M R,1 (·, {0}) is a generalization of d R (·).
Corollary 13. For a linear code
Here we introduce the Singleton-type bound of rank distance [14] , [22] . Proposition 14 (Singleton-Type Bound of Rank Distance [14] , [22] ). Let C ⊆ F n q m be a linear code. Then, the minimum rank distance of C is upper bounded by
Note that the right-hand side of (6) is n − dim C + 1 if m ≥ n and m n (n − dim C) + 1 if m < n. A code satisfying the equality of (6) is called a maximum rank distance (MRD) code [14] . The Gabidulin code [14] is known as an MRD code.
In the following, we shall present some extra properties of the RGRW M R,i (·, ·) and the minimum rank distance d R (·) by using the relation between M R,i (·, ·) and d R (·) shown above and the properties of the RGRW described in the previous subsection. In the case where m ≥ n, Corollary 15 gives a generalization of the Singleton-type bound of rank distance [14] , [22] of C ⊆ F n q m , and Corollary 16 shows that the RGRW of C 1 ⊆ F n q m and C 2 C 1 depends only on C 1 when C 1 is MRD. Proposition 17 presents an upper bound of the first RGRW by combining the Singleton-type bound of rank distance [14] , [22] of C ⊆ F n q m for m < n and the upper bound of the RGRW given in Proposition 10. In the case where m < n, Corollary 18 gives a tighter upper bound of the minimum rank distance of C ⊆ F n q m for m < n and dim C = 1 than that shown in Proposition 14.
First, Lemma 9 and Proposition 10 yield the following corollary from Corollary 13 and Proposition 14. This corollary shows a generalization of the Singleton-type bound of rank distance [14] , [22] of C ⊆ F Proof: From Proposition 10, M R,i (C, {0}) ≤ (n − dim C) + i is immediate. The RGRW M R,i (C, {0}) is strictly increasing with i from Lemma 9, and M R,dim C (C, {0}) ≤ n holds. Therefore, from Corollary 13 and
Next, we give the following corollary of Proposition 10 for the RGRW of C 1 ⊆ F n q m and C 2 C 1 . This corollary reveals that when C 1 is an MRD code with m ≥ n, the i-th RGRW M R,i (C 1 , C 2 ) always coincides with the maximum possible value of M R,i (C 1 , {0}), shown in Corollary 15, regardless of its subcode C 2 .
Corollary 16. Let m ≥ n. Let C 1 ⊆ F n q m be an MRD code and C 2 C 1 be its arbitrary subcode. Then, the RGRW of C 1 and
Proof: By the definition of the RGRW in Definition 5, we first have
By combining Proposition 14 and Proposition 10, we also have the following proposition only for the first RGRW. This proposition presents an upper bound of the first RGRW, obtained by the Singleton-type bound of the rank distance of C ⊆ F 
Proof: As in the proof of Proposition 10, let S F n q m be a linear code such that C 1 = C 2 + S. Also, we suppose that the first dim C 2 coordinates of S are zero without loss of generality. Since S can be viewed as a code of length n − dim C 2 , we have the following inequality from Proposition 14.
Thus, from (5),
Therefore, from Proposition 10, the corollary is proved. The following corollary is immediately obtained from Proposition 17.
Corollary 18. Assume m ≥ 2. For a linear code C ⊆ F n q m , we have the following inequalities.
This corollary presents a tighter upper bound of d R (C) for C ⊆ F n q m than that shown in Proposition 14, when m < n and dim C = 1.
Lastly, by using the relation between the RGRW and the rank distance [14] presented above, we introduce an extra property of the RDIP K R,i (C 1 , C 2 ) when C 1 is MRD. We define [x] + = max{0, x}.
Proposition 19. Let C 1 ⊆ F n q m be a linear code and C 2 C 1 be a its subcode. Assume m ≥ n and C 1 be an MRD code. Then, the RDIP of C 1 and C 2 is given by
and hence K R,µ (C 1 , C 2 ) = 0 for 0 ≤ µ ≤ n − dim C 1 from Theorem 8. On the other hand, from Proposition 9 for i = dim (C 1 /C 2 ), we have
hold from Theorem 8. Therefore, the proposition is established.
III. Universal Security Performance of Secure Network Coding
This section derives the security performance of secure network coding based on the nested coset coding scheme [40] , which is guaranteed independently of the underlying network code construction.
This section first presents the network model with errors, and introduces the wiretap network model and the nested coset coding scheme in secure network coding. Next, we define the universal equivocation, the universal ω-strong security and the universal maximum strength as the universal security performance of secure network coding on the wiretap network model. We then express the universal security performance of secure network coding based on the nested coset coding scheme in terms of the RDIP and the RGRW.
A. Network Model with Errors
We first introduce the basic network model in which no errors occur in the network. As in [6] , [10] , [27] , [34] , [42] , we consider a multicast communication network represented by a directed acyclic multigraph with unit capacity links, a single source node, and multiple sink nodes. We assume that linear network coding [17] , [21] is employed over the network. Elements of a column vector space F m×1 q are called packets. Assume that each link in the network can carry a single F q -symbol per one time slot, and that each link transports a single packet over m time slots without delays, erasures, or errors.
The source node produces n packets X 1 , . . . , X n ∈ F m×1 q and transmits X 1 , . . . , X n on n outgoing links over m consecutive time slots. Define the m × n matrix X = [X 1 , . . . , X n ]. The data flow on any link can be represented as an F q -linear combination of packets X 1 , . . . , X n ∈ F m×1 q . Namely, the information transmitted on a link e can be denoted as b e X T ∈ F 1×m q , where b e ∈ F n q is called a global coding vector (GCV) [13] of e. Suppose that a sink node has N incoming links. Then, the information received at a sink node can be represented as an
is the transfer matrix of the network constructed by gathering the GCV's of N incoming links. The network code is called feasible if each transfer matrix to each sink node has rank n over F q , otherwise it is called rank deficient. The rank deficiency of the network coded network [32] , [34] , [35] is defined by ρ n − min {rank A : A at each sink node} , i.e., the maximum column-rank deficiency of the transfer matrix A among all sink nodes. As in [32] , [34] , [35] , ρ is also referred to as ρ erasures.
The above setup of the network coded network is referred to as an (n × m) q linear network [34] . We may also call it a ρ-erasure (n × m) q linear network when we need to indicate the rank deficiency ρ of the network. Now we extend the basic model of the (n × m) q linear network defined above to incorporate packet errors, as [32] , [34] . We define the network model with errors as follows.
Definition 20 (t-Error (n × m) q Linear Network). Suppose that the network is an (n × m) q linear network. Also suppose that at most t error packets, represented by Z ∈ F m×t q , are injected from t links chosen arbitrarily in the network. That is, the information transported over a link e with the GCV b e is represented by b e X T + f e Z T ∈ F 1×m q , where f e ∈ F 1×t q corresponds to the overall linear transformation applied to the injected error packets Z on the route to the link e. Then, the network is called a t-error (n × m) q linear network.
This t-error (n × m) q linear network may also be called a t-error-ρ-erasure (n × m) q linear network for the rank deficiency ρ. Note that in the t-error (n × m) q linear network, the information received at a sink node is expressed as
where
is constructed by gathering f e 's of incoming links e's to the sink node, and hence D corresponds to the overall linear transformation applied to Z on the route to the sink node.
The system of linear network coding is called coherent if the transfer matrix A is known to each sink node, otherwise it is called noncoherent.
B. Wiretap Network Model and Nested Coset Coding Scheme
Following [34] , [42] , assume that in the t-error (n × m) q linear network defined in Definition 20, there is an adversary who observes packets transmitted on any µ links. We also assume that the adversary knows the coding scheme applied at the source node and all the GCV's in the network.
Let W be the set of µ links observed by the adversary, and let B W ∈ F µ×n q be the transfer matrix whose rows are the GCV's b e 's associated with the links e's in W. The information obtained by the adversary can be expressed by
is constructed by gathering f e 's of links e's in W, and
corresponds to the errors. In the following, we consider the reliable transmission of a secret message through this wiretap network model.
The procedure of the secure message transmission over the wiretap network model is called secure network coding [6] , [10] , [27] , [34] , [42] . In the scenario of secure network coding, first regard an mdimensional column vector space F m×1 q as F q m , and fix l for 1
q m be the secret message of l packets. Under the adversary's observation of µ links, the source node wants to transmit S as small information leakage to the adversary as possible. To protect S from the adversary, the source node encodes S to the transmitted vector X = [X 1 , . . . , X n ] ∈ F n q m of n packets according to some kind of coding scheme. Then, the source node finally transmits X as an m × n matrix over F q to sink nodes through the network. In this paper, we assume that the source node knows nothing about the errors that occur in the network, as in the model of [34] , [42] .
In the secure network coding described in [10] , [27] , [34] , [42] , S is encoded by the nested coset coding scheme [7] , [9] , [37] , [40] at the source node. In secure network coding based on the nested coset coding scheme, S is encoded to X at the source node as follows.
Definition 21 (Nested Coset Coding Scheme). Let C 1 ⊆ F n q m be a linear code over F q m (m ≥ 1), and C 2 C 1 be its subcode with dimension dim
be an arbitrary linear bijection. For a secret message S ∈ F l q m , we randomly choose X from a coset ψ(S ) ∈ C 1 /C 2 . We make no assumption on the joint distribution P S ,X unless otherwise stated.
In [7] , [9] , [18] , the nested coset coding scheme is called a secret sharing scheme based on linear codes. Definition 21 includes the Ozarow-Wyner coset coding scheme [30] as a special case with C 1 = F n q m . Corresponding to X transmitted from the source node, the sink node receives a vector of N packets Y ∈ F N q m . The decoding of S from Y will be discussed in Section IV.
C. Definition of the Universal Security Performance
In order to measure the security performance of secure network coding in the above model, this subsection presents two criteria. The security performance measured by our criteria is guaranteed independently of the underlying network code, hence we call them universal.
Let H(X) be the Shannon entropy for a random variable X, H(X|Y) be the conditional entropy of X given Y, and I(X; Y) be the mutual information between X and Y [8] . The entropy and the mutual information are always computed using log q m .
1) Universal Equivocation: First, we define universal equivocation as follows.
Definition 22 (Universal Equivocation)
. Assume that the secret message S is chosen according to an arbitrary distribution P S over F l q m , and suppose that S is encoded to the transmitted packets X ∈ F n q m by a certain coding scheme. We make no assumption on the joint distribution P S ,X . Then, the universal equivocation Θ µ,P S ,X of the coding scheme is the minimum uncertainty of S given BX T for all B ∈ F µ×n q , defined as
We will also call max Note that the conditional entropy of S given BX T is considered in Definition 22. But, we need to consider the adversary in the t-error (n × m) q linear network as the model presented in Section III-B, i.e., we need to consider the conditional entropy of S given W that contains the errors, as given in (8) . In order to justify this difference between Definition 22 and the wiretap network model, we derive the following proposition.
Proposition 23. Fix a matrix B ∈ F
µ×n q arbitrarily. Let S ∈ F l q m be chosen according to an arbitrary distribution, and let X ∈ F n q m be chosen according to an arbitrary distribution such that S is uniquely determined from X by some surjection. Suppose that E ∈ F µ q m is chosen according to an arbitrary distribution. Then, for
Proof: Observe that S ↔ BX T ↔ W forms a Markov chain. By the data processing inequality [8], we have I(S ; BX T ) ≥ I(S ; W), which implies H(S |W) ≥ H(S |BX).
The statement equivalent to Proposition 23 was given in [42, Theorem 4.1] . This proposition shows that for µ tapped links, the uncertainty of at least Θ µ,P S ,X defined by Definition 22 is always guaranteed even if errors occur in the network. In other words, from Proposition 23, we can see that Definition 22 considers the most advantageous case for the adversary in the wiretap network model given in Section III-B, as with the model considered in [34] , [42] .
As the security measure for secure network coding, the maximum uncertainty of S given B W X T for all possible W's of tapped links was considered in [6] , [10] , [27] , [42] , where m = 1. However, the security measure in [6] , [10] , [27] , [42] is dependent on the underlying network coded network, i.e., it is not universal. On the other hand, as defined in Definition 22, Θ µ,P S ,X does not depend on the set of possible W's of tapped links in the network. Thus, Θ µ,P S ,X is guaranteed on any underlying network code, and hence it is universal.
Silva and Kschischang proposed a scheme based on the nested coset coding scheme with MRD codes C 1 , C 2 [34] with which no information of S is obtained from any dim C 1 − l = dim C 2 links for any distribution of S when the conditional distribution of X given S is uniform over ψ(S ), provided m ≥ n. That is, their scheme guarantees the universal equivocation Θ dim C 1 −l,P S ,X = H(S ) for any distribution of S .
2) Universal ω-Strong Security and Universal Maximum Strength: Definition 22 defines the universal equivocation Θ µ,P S ,X as the security measure for all the components of a secret message S = [S 1 , . . . , S l ]. Consider the case where Θ µ,P S ,X < H(S ), i.e., some information of the secret message leaks to the adversary. Then, some components of S 1 , . . . , S l could be uniquely determined by the adversary. It is clearly desirable that no component of S 1 , . . . , S l is deterministically revealed and that every symbol S i is kept hidden, even if some information of S leaks to the adversary. Hence, we can say that the number of tapped links such that every symbol S i is kept hidden represents the resiliency or strength of the coding scheme against eavesdropping. Now we focus on such security and give the following definition as the resiliency of the coding scheme against eavesdropping.
Definition 24 (Universal ω-Strong Security and Universal Maximum Strength). Let S Z = (S i : i ∈ Z) be a tuple whose indices belong to a subset Z ⊆ {1, . . . , l}. We say that the coding scheme attains universal ω-strong security if we have
for uniformly distributed S and conditionally uniformly distributed X given S . The maximum possible value of ω in the scheme is called universal maximum strength Ω of the coding scheme, defined by
The universal strong security defined in [33] is a special case of Definition 24 for Ω = n − 1 and
Unlike the definition of Θ µ,P S ,X in Definition 22, we have considered the case where the secret message S is uniformly distributed and the transmitted packets X are conditionally uniformly distributed given S . This is because the value of I(S Z ; BX T ) is dependent on the conditional distribution of X given S Z , while Θ µ,P S ,X does not have such dependence. Without assuming a joint probability distribution on S and X, we cannot have a meaningful sufficient condition for I(S Z ; BX T ) = 0 in (10). In Definition 24, the mutual information between a part of S and BX T is considered, and the errors Z contained in the eavesdropped information are not considered. This is based on the same reason that errors are not considered in Definition 22. That is, from Proposition 23, the universal Ω-strong security is always guaranteed even if errors occur in the network.
As in [16] , [25] , [33] , a scheme with universal ω-strong security does not leak any |Z| components of S even if at most ω − |Z| + 1 links are observed by the adversary, provided that P S ,X satisfies the assumption in Definition 24. Moreover, this guarantee holds over any underlying network code as Θ µ,P S ,X . Hence, ω and Ω are also universal. In Corollary 31, we will present an upper bound of I(S Z ; BX T ) with arbitrary P S ,X in terms of Ω.
D. Expression of the Universal Security Performance in Terms of the RDIP and RGRW
In this subsection, we express Θ µ,P S ,X and Ω given in Section III-C in terms of the RDIP and RGRW. We first give the following lemma that will be used in the analysis on the security performance.
Lemma 25. Let C 1 ⊆ F n q m be a linear code and C 2 C 1 be its subcode. For an arbitrary subspace V ⊆ F n q m , we have
Proof:
We note that Lemma 25 is a generalization of Forney's second duality lemma [12] which shows that the dual of the intersection of a code C ⊆ F n q m and a subspace V ∈ Λ(F n q m ) is the projection of the dual code C ⊥ to the support set [12] of V. Because, when
, [8] between probability distributions P A and P B . Also we denote by D(A B|C) the conditional relative entropy [8] between two conditional probability distributions P A|C and P B|C given C. 
and
where we have written S = F l q m for the sake of simple description. If both S and X are uniformly distributed over F l q m and C 1 respectively, the equalities in (11) and (12) 
). If I(S ; W) = 0 holds for a distribution of S that assigns a positive probability to every element in
Proof: We first recall that for random variables A ∈ A and B ∈ B, we have the following relations among the conditional entropy and the (conditional) relative entropy [8] :
where A ∈ A(b) with probability one given B = b and E denotes the expectation. In the following, we will use these relationships to prove the lemma.
Recall that for given S = s as a realization of S , there exists a unique coset ψ(s) ∈ C 1 /C 2 . Also observe that for given W = w as a realization of W, there exists a unique coset X(w) = {x ∈ C 1 :
. Observe that X belongs to ψ(s) ∩ X(w) when S = s and W = w, and that log q m |ψ(s) ∩ X(w)| = log q m C 2 ∩ row (B) ⊥ = dim C 2 ∩ row (B) ⊥ for any s and w. Thus, by (14) , we have
Also observe that X is distributed over X(w) when W = w, and that log q m |X(
⊥ for any w. Thus, by (14), we obtain
Recall that X is distributed over a coset ψ(s) ∈ C 1 /C 2 for fixed S = s, and log q m |ψ(s)| = dim C 2 for any s. Thus, by (14), we have
Let a subspace W = {xB T : x ∈ C 1 }. For the cardinality of W, we have log
⊥ ). Thus, by (13), we have
By expanding I(S ; W) and substituting (15), (17) and (18) into the expanded equation (19), we obtain
, (by Lemma 25) which proves (11) .
On the other hand, observe that
because the number of possible S for any given W = w is exactly equal to q (13) ) which proves (12) .
Here, we show the equalities in (11) and (12) for the uniformly distributed S and X. Assume that S is uniform over F l q m . Then, from (13), we have D(S U S ) = l − H(S ) = 0. Also, when X is uniform over C 1 , (14) . Therefore, the equalities in (11) and (12) hold.
Finally, we show the last statement for the distribution of S that assigns a positive probability to every element in F l q m . Fix the distribution of X over ψ(s) given S = s arbitrarily. Let P S be a distribution of S such that all elements in F l q m have positive probabilities, and assume that I(S ; W) = 0 holds for P S . Recall that the mutual information is expressed in terms of the relative entropy [8] 
Note that the matrix B in Lemma 26 is defined over the field extension F q m , while the transfer matrix B to the wiretapper is restricted to the subfield F q in the wiretap network model defined in Section III-B.
Cai and Yeung [3] , [5] , [6] considered the security condition of secure network coding such that the adversary obtains no information of the secret message when S and X are chosen according to distributions that assign positive probabilities to all the secret messages and the transmitted packets [4, Lemma 3.1]. Their security condition corresponds to the last statement in Lemma 26 and the fact that I(S ; W) = 0 when dim (C ⊥ 2 ∩ row (B)) = dim (C ⊥ 1 ∩ row (B)) holds and X is conditionally uniform over ψ(S ) given S from (11) . Note that in the last statement in Lemma 26, we made no assumption on the distribution of X, unlike [4, Lemma 3.1]. For an arbitrary joint distribution of S and X, Zhang and Yeung [41] generalized the security condition of [3] , [5] , [6] that corresponds to the last statement in Lemma 26. We should note that in the last statement in Lemma 26, we assumed the distribution of S that assigns a positive probability to every message, in order to express the condition in terms of the dimensions of subspaces. The proof of Lemma 26 can be adapted to the case of arbitrarily distributed S , and we can easily show that if I(S ; W) = 0 for P S , we have I(S ′ ; W ′ ) = 0 for any P S ′ satisfying {s : P S ′ (s) > 0} ⊆ {s : P S (s) > 0}. Further, unlike [3] , [5] , [6] , [41] , Lemma 26 additionally derived the upper and lower bounds of the mutual information leaked to the adversary by using the relative entropy for arbitrarily distributed S and X. In the following, we shall derive the security performance expressed in terms of the RDIP and the RGRW by using Lemma 26, which is guaranteed independently of the underlying network coded network.
Here we recall that if an 
We give the following theorem for the maximum amount of information leakage to the adversary, defined in Definition 22.
Theorem 27. Consider the nested coset coding scheme with C 1 , C 2 and ψ in Definition 21. Then, the maximum amount of information leakage to the adversary, defined in Definition 22, is in the range of
where we have written S = F l q m for the sake of simple description. If both the secret message S and the transmitted packets X are uniformly distributed over F l q m and C 1 respectively, the maximum amount of information leakage exactly equals max
. If the maximum amount of information leakage is exactly zero for a distribution of S that assigns a positive probability to every element in F 
From Lemma 26, we have
For the first terms on the right-hand side of (23) and (24), we have This theorem includes the condition such that the maximum amount of information leakage is exactly zero. This corresponds to the security condition of secure network coding given in [3] - [6] , for all possible sets of tapped links, as Lemma 26 for one set of possible tapped links. We note that while our condition is independent of the underlying network code, i.e., universal, their security condition is dependent on the underlying network code. Further, as Lemma 26, we should note that the distribution of X is arbitrary in the last statement in Theorem 27.
Theorem 27 immediately yields the following proposition for the universal equivocation.
Proposition 28.
Consider the nested coset coding scheme with C 1 , C 2 and ψ in Definition 21. Then, the universal equivocation Θ µ,P S ,X , defined in Definition 22, is in the range of
. When both the secret message S and the transmitted packets X are uniformly distributed over F l q m and C 1 respectively, we have Θ µ,P S ,
Also from Theorem 27, we have the following corollary by the RGRW.
Corollary 29.
Consider the transmission of X ∈ F n q m over the wiretap network, which is generated from the secret message S by the nested coset coding scheme with C 1 , C 2 and ψ, defined in Definition 21. Then, 1) if the adversary observes µ < M R, j (C 
. This implies that from Theorem 27, the maximum amount of information leakage is at most j − 1 + D(X U ψ(S ) |S ) from less than M R, j (C and uniformly distributed X ∈ C 1 , in terms of the minimum rank distance. Namely, they showed that the adversary obtains no information of S from any d R (C
Ngai et al. [27] and Zhang et al. [42] analyzed the lower bound of the uncertainty of the secret message by the (R)NGHW in the case where the transmitted packets X are uniformly distributed over ψ(S ). Proposition 28 and Corollary 29 correspond to their results using (R)NGHW. We should note that unlike [27] , [42] , we considered the case where both S and X are arbitrarily distributed, and derived both upper and lower bounds. Further, while our analyses using the RDIP and the RGRW are universal, the analyses using (R)NGHW in [27] , [42] are dependent on the underlying network code.
Lastly, we express Ω in Definition 24 in terms of the RGRW. In order to derive Ω, we first introduce the following proposition that reveals the mutual information between a part of the message S and observed packets of the adversary in the case where S and the transmitted packets X are arbitrarily distributed.
Proposition 30.
Consider the nested coset coding scheme and fix C 1 , C 2 and ψ in Definition 21. For a subset Z ⊆ {1, . . . , l}, let S Z (S i : i ∈ Z), and C 3,Z be a subcode of C 1 defined by
Also, define a bijective function ψ Z :
Then, the maximum amount of the mutual information between S Z and BX T is in the range of
where we have written S Z = F |Z| q m . If both S and X are uniformly distributed over F l q m and C 1 respectively, it exactly equals max
Proof: For a subset Z ⊆ {1, . . . , l}, C 3,Z is an F q m -linear subspace satisfying C 2 ⊆ C 3,Z ⊆ C 1 and dim C 3,Z = dim C 1 − |Z|. Hence, the information leakage of S Z in the nested coset coding with C 1 and C 2 according to P S ,X is equal to the one in the nested coset coding scheme with C 1 and C 3,Z according to P S Z ,X , where P S Z ,X is the joint distribution of S Z and X. Thus, by Theorem 27, (28) holds. Assume that S and X are uniformly distributed over F l q m and C 1 , respectively. Then, S Z is uniform over F |Z| q m , and from the definition of ψ Z in (27) , X is also uniform over ψ Z (S Z ) given S . Therefore, we have max B∈F 
I(S
where ψ Z (S Z ) is defined by (27) .
Proof: When S and X are uniformly distributed, we have max B∈F 
for arbitrarily distributed S and X. This corollary shows that if the maximum universal strength Ω is known, the maximum amount of information leakage of S Z to the adversary can be estimated by calculating D(X U ψ Z (S Z ) |S Z ) depending on distributions of S and X. This also implies that when D(X U ψ Z (S Z ) |S Z ) > 0 for some Z, a part of the secret message might be revealed to the wiretapper from µ < Ω − |Z| tapped links. Here, we note that D(X U ψ Z (S Z ) |S Z ) is always zero for any ψ and any Z when S and X are uniformly distributed over F l q m and C 1 , respectively. From these observations, we can say that since S and X are assumed to be uniform in Definition 24, the maximum universal strength Ω represents the resiliency of the scheme against eavesdropping in the ideal environment in which every part of the secret message is hidden.
By Proposition 30, we have the following theorem which exactly expresses Ω in terms of the RGRW.
Theorem 32. Fix C 1 , C 2 and ψ in Definition 21, and consider the corresponding nested coset coding scheme. For a subset Z ⊆ {1, . . . , l}, let S Z (S i : i ∈ Z) and C 3,Z be a subcode of C 1 , defined by (26) . Then, the universal maximum strength Ω of the scheme, defined in Definition 24, is given by
The universal maximum strength Ω, i.e., the maximum value of ω, is given as
(by Lemma 9) In order to derive the exact value of Ω, we must calculate the RGRW's of C 1 and C 3,Z 's for all possible Z's as shown in Theorem 32. Thus, the calculation of Ω involves the search for the minimum value of the RGRW over the exponentially large set for l. Here, we give the upper and lower bounds of Ω. The bounds can be obtained by calculating only l values of RGRW's, hence they are useful for estimating the value of Ω in nested coset coding schemes. An upper bound of Ω is simply obtained by Theorem 32 as follows.
Proposition 33. Fix C 1 , C 2 and ψ in Definition 21, and consider the corresponding nested coset coding scheme. For i ⊆ {1, . . . , l}, let C 3,{i} be a subcode of C 1 , defined in (26) for Z = {i}. Then, the universal maximum strength Ω of the scheme is upper bounded by
We also give a lower bound of Ω. . Then, the universal maximum strength Ω of the scheme is lower bounded by
Proof: From the definition of
Recall that S 1 , . . . , S l are mutually independent and uniformly distributed over F q m . Thus, Z {i} can be regarded as the one generated from a secret message S i ∈ F q m by a nested coset coding scheme with D 1,i and D 2,i according to the uniform distribution over τ(S i ), that is, Z {i} ∈ τ(S i ) is chosen uniformly at random from τ(S i ) ∈ D 1,i /D 2,i . Therefore, we have I(S i ; DZ 
. . , S l are mutually independent, the mutual information between S R ′ and BX T is given by
from the chain rule [8] . Since the mutual information is nonnegative (29) . Remark 35. In [18] , the security analysis of secret sharing schemes based on linear codes was given in terms of the relative dimension/length profile and the relative generalized Hamming weight [23] . By replacing the RDIP and the RGRW in all the theorems given in this section with the RDLP and the RGHW and restricting shares to be uniformly distributed over C 1 , we can obtain the theorems presented in [18] 
Remark 36.
In [27] , [42] , the security analysis of secure network coding in the case of packet length m = 1 was given in terms of the (relative) network generalized Hamming weight (R)NGHW. By replacing the RGRW with the (R)NGHW and restricting transmitted packets to be uniformly distributed over C 1 , Corollary 29 becomes [27, Theorem 7] , [42, Lemma 4.3] . Note that since the (R)NGHW is determined according to the GCV's of all links as we explained in Section II-B, their security analysis by the (R)NGHW is dependent on the underlying network code construction, unlike our analysis by the RDIP and RGRW.
IV. Universal Error Correction Capability of Secure Network Coding
This section derives the error correction capability of the nested coset coding scheme by using the approach in [32, Section III], which is guaranteed independently of the underlying network code construction. We shall consider the error correction not only over the coherent system of network coding but also over the noncoherent system.
First, we give a definition of error correction capability in secure network coding, and introduce the coding scheme for the noncoherent network coding system. Next, we briefly review Silva et al.'s approach [32, Section III] . By using their approach, we analyze and express the error-correction capability of the nested coset coding scheme in terms of the RGRW over the coherent network coding system. We finally extend the analysis to the noncoherent systems. From now on, only one sink node may be assumed without loss of generality.
A. Definition of Error Correction in Secure Network Coding
Now we consider a coding scheme that is a generalization of the nested coset coding scheme, described as follows.
Definition 37. Let S be a set of possible secret messages. Let P S be a collection of sets of n-dimensional vectors over F q m such that |P S | = |S| and each element in P S is a non-empty set. Assume that there exists a certain bijective function between S and P S . The coding scheme first maps a secret message S ∈ S to a unique set X S ∈ P S (X S ⊆ F n q m , |X S | > 0) of n-dimensional vectors by the bijective function. Then, an element X ∈ X S is chosen from X S and served as n packets transmitted through the network.
Here we note that in the nested coset coding scheme with C 1 and C 2 , S = F l q m , X S = ψ(S ) ∈ C 1 /C 2 and P S = {X S : S ∈ S} = C 1 /C 2 , as defined in Definition 21. The reason we consider Definition 37 is that we need to analyze the error correction capability in generalized fashion in the case of the noncoherent network coding system, due to the modification to the nested coset coding scheme as described later in Section IV-A2. For this generalized coding scheme, we define the following error correction capability in the model of network coding described in Section III-A.
Definition 38 (Universally t-Error-ρ-Erasure-Correcting).
Consider the t-error-ρ-erasure (n × m) q linear network in Definition 20. Consider a coding scheme defined in Definition 37. Then, the coding scheme is called universally t-error-ρ-erasure-correcting, if every S ∈ S can be uniquely determined from
As defined in Definition 38, the capability of universally t-error-ρ-erasure-correcting is guaranteed on any underlying network code, and hence it is called universal. Silva et al.'s secure network coding scheme [34, Section VI] uses MRD codes C 1 and C 2 , and it is universally t-error-ρ-erasure-correcting when the minimum rank distance [14] of C 1 is greater than 2t + ρ.
Here, we explain the coding scheme executed at the source node in the case of both a coherent system and a noncoherent system. 1) Case of Coherent System: First we explain the fundamental case of a coherent network coding system, i.e., the transfer matrix A is known to the sink node. In this case, the source node simply encodes a secret message S ∈ S = F l q m to the transmitted n packets X ∈ X S = ψ(S ) by the nested coset coding scheme with C 1 , C 2 , as explained in Section III-B. And then, P S = C 1 /C 2 . Finally, X ∈ F n q m is regarded as an m × n matrix over F q , and transmitted through the network.
2) Case of Noncoherent System: As described in Section III-A, the transfer matrix A is unknown to the sink node in the case of a noncoherent network coding system. In this case, the source node appends appropriate packet headers to the packets generated by the nested coset coding scheme. The addition of packet headers is called the lifting construction [35] . Since the information of GCV's are carried by the packet headers in the lifting construction, this allows the scheme to be decoded when A is unknown.
The lifting construction [35] of the nested coset coding scheme is described in detail as follows. Let
be an F q -linear isomorphism that expands an element of F q m as a column vector over F q with respect to some fixed basis for F q m over F q . Let m m − n, and let C 1 ⊆ F n q m and C 2 C 1 be a linear code and its subcode, respectively. By the nested coset coding scheme with C 1 , C 2 , we generate
over the base field F q , we construct X ∈ F n q m of transmitted n packets that is represented as
as a matrix over F q , where the identity matrix I ∈ F n×n q is the packet header. Hence, X S and P S is given by
: X ∈ ψ(S ) ,
where X ∈ F n q m is regarded as an m × n matrix over F q . Here, recall that we defined S(X) ⊆ F q m for X = [X 1 , . . . , X n ] ∈ F n q m as an F q -linear subspace of F q m spanned by X 1 , . . . , X n , and note that dim F q S(X) = n is always guaranteed for all X ∈ X S ,lift and all X S ,lift ∈ P lift by the packet header I.
Remark 39. The packet headers of the lifting construction do not convey the information generated from the secret message, and convey only the information of the GCV's (and errors). Thus, appending packet headers does not affect the security given in Section III.
The following subsections analyze the universal error correction capability of the nested coset coding scheme in the coherent system, and also analyze that of the lifting construction of the nested coset coding scheme in the noncoherent system.
B. Brief Review of Silva et al.'s Approach
First we briefly review the approach of [32, Section III] . Consider a transmission of data over a channel in which there exists an adversary. Let the channel be specified by a finite input alphabet P (e.g., a code), a finite output alphabet Q (e.g., a vector space), and a collection of fan-out sets Q P ⊆ Q for all P ∈ P (e.g., a collection of cosets). For each input P ∈ P, the output Q of the channel is constrained to be in Q P but is otherwise arbitrarily chosen by an adversary. A decoder for P is any functionP : Q → P ∪ { f }, where f P denotes a decoding failure, i.e., detected errors. When P ∈ P is transmitted and Q ∈ Q P is received, a decoder is said to be successful ifP(Q) = P. We also say that a decoder is infallible if it is successful for all Q ∈ Q P and all P ∈ P.
Assume that the fan-out sets for a input P is given as
for some ∆ : P × Q → N. The value ∆(P, Q) is called the discrepancy between P and Q for the given channel, which represents the minimum effort required for an adversary in the channel to transform P to Q. The value t represents the maximum effort of the adversary allowed in the channel. The problem is to decode P from Q by correcting at most t discrepancy. Then, the minimum-discrepancy decoder is defined byP
The relation between the discrepancy function and the error correction capability of this decoder was given in [32] as follows.
Definition 40 ( [32, Definition 1]). For a discrepancy function
Then, ∆ is said to be normal if, for all P, P ′ ∈ P and all 0 ≤ i ≤ δ(P, P ′ ), there exists some Q ∈ Q such that ∆(P, Q) = i and ∆(P, Q) = δ(P, P ′ ) − i.
Theorem 41 ( [32, Proposition 1, Theorem 3])
. Let δ(P) = min {δ(P, P ′ ) : P, P ′ ∈ P, P P ′ }. Suppose ∆(·, ·) is normal. Then, the minimum discrepancy decoderP is infallible if and only if t ≤ ⌊(δ(P) − 1)/2⌋.
C. Universal Error Correction Capability of Secure Network Coding over Coherent Network Coding
By applying the above approach [32, Section III] to the secure network coding over the coherent network coding system in Section IV-A1, this subsection derives the universal error correction capability of the nested coset coding scheme with C 1 , C 2 for given A, in terms of the RGRW.
Recall that the received packets Y are given by Y T = AX T + DZ T in the setup of Section III-B, and that X ∈ F n q m is chosen from a set X S ∈ P S corresponding to S ∈ S by a certain coding scheme defined in Definition 37. Note that we do not restrict the coding scheme to the nested coset coding scheme here. From now on, we write X X S for the sake of simplicity. Suppose that the transfer matrix A is known to the sink node as in Section IV-A1. Here, we define the discrepancy function between X and Y for given A by
This definition of ∆ A (X, Y) represents the minimum number r of error packets Z required to be injected in order to transform at least one element of X into Y, as [33, (9) ]. For the discrepancy function ∆ A (X, Y), the minimum discrepancy decoder is given aŝ
Note that "the minimum discrepancy decoderP is infallible" in Theorem 41 means that for the discrepancy function ∆ A (X, Y), "any t error packets can be corrected by the coding scheme for given A using the minimum discrepancy decoderX." In the following, we will show that ∆ A (X, Y) is normal. We define the ∆-distance [32] between X and X ′ , induced by ∆ A (X, Y), as
for X, X ′ ∈ P S . Let δ A (P S ) be the minimum ∆-distance given by
Proof: From Lemma 42, we have
Lemma 44. For X, X ′ ∈ P S , we have
The rank distance satisfies the triangle inequality [14] . This lower bound can be achieved by choosing, e.g., Y = XA T . Therefore, from (35), we have (34).
Lemma 45. The discrepancy function ∆ A (X, Y) is normal.
Proof: Let X, X ′ ∈ P S and let 0
. Here, we can always find two vectors W, This proposition implies that the coding scheme given in Definition 37 is guaranteed to determine the unique set X against any t packet errors for any fixed A if and only if δ A (P S ) > 2t. Here we note that if X is uniquely determined, S is also uniquely determined from Definition 37.
In the following, we restrict the coding scheme to the nested coset coding scheme with C 1 and C 2 , and present a special case of Proposition 46 expressed in terms of the RGRW. That is, we set S = F l q m and P S = C 1 /C 2 as defined in Definition 21.
Lemma 48 ( [26] , [33] ). For an arbitrary vector x ∈ F n q m and an arbitrary matrix A ∈ F N×n q , we have 
On the other hand, if dim M x ⊥ > n − ρ, i.e., if rank M x = dim F q S(x) < ρ, we can always choose A satisfying rank A = n − ρ and A M x ⊥ . Then, for such A, we have A = M x ⊥ ∩ A and hence
Therefore, the lemma is established. 
Therefore, from Proposition 46 for P S = C 1 /C 2 , the theorem is proved.
D. Extension to Noncoherent Network Coding System
In this subsection, we extend the analysis for the coherent network coding system, given in Section IV-C, to one for the noncoherent system in the setup of Section IV-A2. We derive an expression for the error correction capability of the lifting construction [35] of the nested coset coding scheme in terms of the RGRW.
As in Section IV-C, we first consider the correction capability of the generalized coding scheme defined in Definition 37. Recall that in the noncoherent network coding system, the transfer matrix A at the sink node is unknown. Define the discrepancy function between X = X S ∈ P S and Y for unknown A with at most ρ rank deficiency, as follows:
where the second equality is obtained by (32) . The definition of ∆ ρ (X, Y) represents the minimum number r of error packets Z required to be injected in order to transform at least one element of X into Y, for at least one transfer matrix A satisfying rank A ≥ n − ρ. For ∆ ρ (X, Y), the minimum discrepancy decoder is given asX
We also define ∆-distance between X and X ′ , induced by ∆ ρ (X, Y), as
where the second equality is obtained by (36) . Let ∆ ρ (P S ) be the minimum ∆-distance given by
Observe that from Lemma 43, we can rewrite ∆ ρ (X, Y) as
Also, from Lemma 44, we have
Lemma 51. The discrepancy function ∆ ρ (X, Y) is normal.
be fixed matrices that minimize (39) , and then suppose thatX ∈ X andX ′ ∈ X ′ are vectors satisfying d = d R (XA T ,X ′ A ′T ). Here, we can always find two vectors W, Proposition 52. Consider the t-error (n × m) q linear network in Definition 20. Suppose that for a secret message S ∈ S, the transmitted n packets X ∈ X are generated by a coding scheme defined in Definition 37. Then, the minimum discrepancy decoder for ∆ ρ (X, Y) is infallible if and only if t ≤ ⌊(δ ρ (P S ) − 1)/2⌋. This proposition implies that the coding scheme given in Definition 37 is guaranteed to determine the unique set X against any t packet errors if and only if δ ρ (P S ) > 2t.
In the following, we restrict X to that generated by the lifting construction [35] of the nested coset coding scheme, as described in Section IV-A2, and we shall express the error correction capability given in Proposition 52 in terms of the RGRW. Recall that in the lifting construction of the nested coset coding scheme, C 1 ⊆ F n q m and C 2 C 1 are a linear code and its subcode for m = m − n, respectively. Also recall that S = F l q m , X S = X S ,lift and P S = P lift defined in (31) . We will consider the error correction capability in this setup. Here, we introduce the following proposition given in [32] .
Proposition 53 ( [32, Proposition 18]). For
From this proposition, we have the following lemma.
Proof: Since the transmitted packets are generated by the lifting construction of the nested coset coding scheme, we have dim F q S(X) = n for all X ∈ X and for all X ∈ P lift . For X ∈ X ∈ P lift and X ′ ∈ X ′ ∈ P lift , we thus have
where in the first equality, X and X ′ ∈ F n q m are regarded as m × n matrices over F q , X T = I φ m ( X) T and X ′T = I φ m ( X ′ ) T , respectively. Thus, by combining Proposition 53 and (39), we have the following equation for X S ,lift , X S ′ ,lift ∈ P lift .
Therefore, we finally have
This lemma yields the following proposition. Proof: From Lemma 54, we have
Thus, from Proposition 52 for P S = P lift , the proposition is proved. This proposition implies that, by applying the lifting construction, the correction capability of the nested coset coding scheme is maintained even over the noncoherent network coding system. V. A Construction of Secure Network Coding and Its Analysis In this section, we propose a construction of the nested coset coding scheme with C 1 and C 2 , and show its universal security performance and universal error correction capability by the analyses in Section III and Section IV. By adding the error correction, the proposed scheme is an extension of the universal strongly secure network coding scheme based on a systematic MRD code, presented in our earlier conference paper [19] . As well as the scheme of Silva and Kschischang [34] , the proposed scheme guarantees the universal equivocation Θ dim C 1 −l,P S ,X = H(S ) when the conditional distribution of X given S is uniform on ψ(S ), and it is universally t-error-ρ-erasure-correcting when n − dim C 1 + 1 > 2t + ρ. Moreover, unlike Silva et al.'s scheme, our scheme guarantees the universal maximum strength Ω = dim C 1 − 1, which means that no part of the secret message is deterministically revealed from the eavesdropped information observed from at most dim C 1 − 1 links over any underlying network code. An explicit construction of the nested coset coding scheme satisfying Ω = dim C 1 − 1 had remained an open question [35] , and hence we solve this open question by the proposed scheme.
For the sake of simplicity, this section considers the fundamental case of a coherent network coding system. In the case of noncoherent network coding, we can simply customize the proposed scheme by the lifting construction as we described in Section IV-A2
A. Theorems for Nested Coset Coding Scheme with MRD codes
In this subsection, we first introduce some theorems for the nested coset coding scheme using MRD codes C 1 ⊆ F n q m and C 2 C 1 . These theorems can be used to reveal the security performance and errorcorrection capability of the scheme proposed by Silva and Kschischang [34] , and they will be also used in the next subsection to clarify the performance of our proposed scheme.
First, we present the following two theorems that are established regardless of the choice of ψ in the nested coset coding scheme. For the universal equivocation Θ µ,P S ,X , since the dual of an MRD code is also MRD, we immediately have the following theorem from Proposition 19 and Proposition 28.
Theorem 56. Assume m ≥ n. Let C 1 ⊆ F n q m be a linear code and let C 2 C 1 its subcode. Suppose that C 2 is an MRD code. Write l = dim C 1 − dim C 2 . Then, for the nested coset coding scheme with C 1 and C 2 in Definition 21, the universal equivocation is in the range of
This theorem shows that if X is uniform, the universal equivocation is Θ dim C 2 ,P S ,X = H(S ). Also for the universal error correction capability, we immediately have the following theorem from Corollary 16 and Theorem 50.
Theorem 57. Assume m ≥ n. Let C 1 ⊆ F n q m be a linear code and let C 2 C 1 its subcode. Suppose that C 1 is an MRD code. Then, the nested coset coding scheme with C 1 and C 2 in Definition 21 is universally t-error-ρ-erasure-correcting if and only if 2t + ρ < n − dim C 1 + 1.
Next, we present a theorem for the universal maximum strength, which is dependent on the setting of ψ unlike Theorem 56 and Theorem 57. We have the following theorem immediately from Corollary 16 and Theorem 32 since the dual of an MRD code is also MRD.
Theorem 58. Assume m ≥ n. Let C 1 ⊆ F n q m be a linear code and let C 2 C 1 its subcode. Write l = dim C 1 − dim C 2 . Let a bijective function ψ : F l q m → C 1 /C 2 be fixed in such a way that for all Z ⊆ {1, . . . , l}, an F q m -linear subspace C 3,Z defined in (26) is an MRD code with dim C 3,Z = dim C 1 − |Z| and d R (C 3,Z ) = n−dim C 1 −|Z|+1. Then, the nested coset coding scheme with C 1 , C 2 and ψ in Definition 21 guarantees the universal maximum strength Ω = dim C 1 − 1.
Silva and Kschischang [34] proposed a nested coset coding scheme with C 1 ⊆ F n q m and C 2 C 1 . In their scheme, both C 1 and C 2 are MRD with m ≥ n, and hence Theorem 56 and Theorem 57 are simultaneously established. However, in their scheme the bijective function ψ is specified in such a way that the condition in Theorem 58 is not always satisfied. Thus, their scheme does not always guarantee the universal maximum strength Ω = dim C 1 − 1.
In the next subsection, we present an explicit construction of the nested coset coding scheme that satisfies all the assumptions in Theorems 56, 57 and 58 simultaneously.
B. Description of the Proposed Scheme
Assume that the degree m of the field extension F q m satisfies m ≥ l + n. Then, the proposed scheme generates the transmitted n packets X ∈ F n q m by the following setting of the nested coset coding scheme.
First, we set the linear codes
. Let L {l + 1, . . . , l + n} be an index set. Define C 1 P L (D) as a punctured code of D to the index set L. Also define C 2 D L as a shortened code of D to the index set L. Here we note the following facts for C 1 , C 2 . Since an MRD code is also MDS, a k × k matrix over F q m consisting of arbitrary k columns of G is always nonsingular, and hence dim P L (D) = dim C 1 = k. On the other hand, since D is systematic and L ⊇ {k + 1, . . . , l + n}, the shortening of D to L simply reduces the dimension of D over F q m by l, i.e., dim D L = dim C 2 = k − l. Also, we should note that from the definition of the punctured code and shortened code, we have C 2 ⊆ C 1 , and
Next, we set the bijective function ψ : F l q m → C 1 /C 2 . We define submatrices of the systematic generator matrix G of D as follows.
Then, we set ψ by ∆G ∈ F l×n q m as follows.
We note that G 1
q m is the generator matrix of C 1 , and
is the generator matrix of C 2 . Also note that since rank ∆G = l from dim
In our scheme, we execute the nested coset coding scheme with these settings of C 1 , C 2 and ψ, and generate the transmitted packets X. Then, the source node transmits X over the network as described in Section III-A, and the sink node receives Y and executes the decoding operation on Y by the minimum discrepancy decoder given in IV-C. The universal security performance and the universal error correction capability of our scheme is clarified in the next subsection.
Remark 59. Consider the case where D is not a systematic MRD code but a systematic Reed-Solomon code in the above settings. Then, this nested coset coding scheme becomes the strongly-secure secret sharing scheme of Nishiara and Takizawa [28] . Similarly to the relation between the wiretap channel II and secure network coding, our scheme can be viewed as a generalization of their scheme [28] for network coding.
C. Analyses on the Proposed Scheme
This subsection presents the analyses on the proposed scheme described in the previous subsection. We first reveal the security performance and error correction capability of our scheme. Next, we discuss the required packet length in our scheme.
1) Security Performance and Error Correction Capability of the Proposed Scheme:
Here, we perform analyses on the security performance and the error correction capability of the proposed scheme using the theorems presented in Section V-A.
First, in order to show that assumptions in Theorems 56-58 are satisfied in our scheme, we give the following lemmas about a shortened code and a punctured code of a systematic MRD code. Proof: Since C is systematic and I ⊇ {dim C + 1, . . . , N}, the shortening of C to I simply reduces the dimension of C over F q m by N − |I|, i.e., dim C I = dim C − N + |I|. is an MRD code with dim P I (C) = dim C and d R (P I (C)) = |I| − dim C + 1.
Proof:
Since an MRD code is also MDS, a dim C × dim C matrix over F q m consisting of arbitrary dim C columns of the generator matrix of C is always nonsingular. Thus, the dimension of a punctured code P I (C) of length |I|(≥ dim C) is dim P I (C) = dim C.
The puncturing of C to I reduces the minimum rank distance of C by at most N − |I| (≤ dim C) from the definition of rank distance [14] . This implies that d R (P I (C)) ≥ d R (C) − N + |I|. From m ≥ N, we thus have
On the other hand, from m ≥ N and the Singleton-type bound for the rank distance given in Proposition 14, we have d R (P I (C)) ≤ |I| − dim P I (C) + 1 = |I| − dim C + 1.
Therefore, we have d R (P I (C)) = |I| − dim C + 1. By the above lemmas, we finally derive the following propositions for the universal security performance and the universal error correction capability in our scheme, and show that our scheme satisfies Theorems 56, 57 and 58 simultaneously.
Proposition 62. Consider the nested coset coding scheme proposed in Section V-B. Then, the universal equivocation Θ µ,P S ,X of the scheme is in the range of
Proof: From Lemma 60, since m ≥ l + n, we have dim C 2 = k − l, and C 2 is an MRD code with d R (C 2 ) = n + l − k + 1. Thus, from Theorem 56, we have the proposition.
Proposition 63. The nested coset coding scheme proposed in Section V-B is universally t-error-ρ-erasurecorrecting if and only if 2t + ρ < n − k + 1.
Proof: From Lemma 61, since m ≥ l + n, we have dim C 1 = dim D = k, and C 1 is an MRD code with d R (C 1 ) = n − k + 1. Therefore, the proposition is proved from Theorem 57. + 1, . . . , l + n} ⊇ {k + 1, . . . , l + n} from l ≤ k, D Z is an MRD code with dim D Z = k − |Z| and d R (D Z ) = l + n − k + 1 from Lemma 60. In the proposed scheme, we can see that for Z, C 3,Z defined in (26) can be defined as a punctured code of D Z to an index set {l + 1 − |Z|, . . . , l + n − |Z|}, i.e., it is obtained by eliminating first l − |Z| coordinates of codewords in D Z , from the definition of ψ. Hence, from Lemma 61, C 3,Z ⊆ F n q m is an MRD code with dim C 3,Z = k − |Z| and d R (C 3,Z ) = n − k − |Z| + 1. Therefore, we have the proposition from Theorem 58.
Here we note that in the proposed scheme, the exact value of Ω derived in Corollary 64 coincides with the upper and lower bounds of Ω that are respectively given by Proposition 33 and Proposition 34. The reason is as follows. For i ∈ {1, . . . , l} and {i} = {1, . . . , l + n}\{i}, define the punctured code 2) Required Packet Length m: Assume that m = l + n − 1 in Lemma 60 and Lemma 61. Then, from their proofs, Lemma 60 and Lemma 61 do not always hold. This implies that Propositions 62-64 do not always hold if the packet length is m < l + n in our scheme. Hence, m ≥ l + n is the necessary condition for our scheme to always satisfy Propositions 62-64 simultaneously.
On the other hand, in [33, Theorem 8], Silva et al. showed only the existence of the nested coset coding scheme satisfying the universal maximum strength Ω = dim C 1 − 1 if the packet length is m ≥ (l + n) 2 /8 + log q 16l. In contrast, we have demonstrated an explicit construction of the nested coset coding scheme satisfying Ω = dim C 1 −1 whenever m ≥ l+n. Furthermore, we always have l+n < (l+n) 2 /8+log q 16l for l ≥ 1 and n ≥ 2. Therefore, our condition for the packet length is less demanding than that of Silva et al.'s sufficient condition.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced two relative code parameters, the relative dimension/intersection profile (RDIP) of a linear code C 1 ⊆ F n q m and its subcode C 2 C 1 and the relative generalized rank weight (RGRW) of C 1 and C 2 . We have also elucidated some basic properties of the RDIP and the RGRW. We have clarified the relation between the RGRW and the Gabidulin's rank distance [14] , that between the RGRW and the relative generalized Hamming weight [23] , and that between the RGRW and the relative network generalized Hamming weight [42] . As applications of the RDIP and the RGRW, the security performance and the error correction capability of secure network coding based on the nested coset coding scheme with C 1 and C 2 have been analyzed and clarified. We have revealed that the security performance and the error correction capability, guaranteed independently of the underlying network code, are expressed in terms of the RDIP and the RGRW. Further, we have proposed an explicit construction of the nested coset coding scheme, and have analyzed its universal security performance and universal error correction capability by using the RDIP and the RGRW. As well as the scheme of Silva and Kschischang [34] , the proposed scheme guarantees, independently of the underlying network code, that no information of the secret message is obtained from any µ ≤ dim C 2 tapped links when the transmitted packets are uniformly distributed over C 1 , and that the secret message is correctly decodable against any t error packets injected somewhere in the network and ρ rank deficiency of the transfer matrix of the sink node whenever n − dim C 1 + 1 < 2t + ρ holds. Moreover, our scheme also always guarantees that no part of the secret message is revealed to the adversary with µ ≤ dim C 1 − 1 tapped links when the secret message and transmitted packets are uniformly distributed, unlike Silva et al.'s scheme [33] , [34] .
The design of a linear code C 1 and its subcode C 2 for the desired RGRW is left as an open problem for future work. Another possible avenue is to derive other types of bounds of the RGRW, e.g., generalizing the Gilbert-Varshamov bound of the rank distance [15] for the RGRW, etc.
